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ROGUE COMMITTEES OR ROGUE JUDGES: THE LIMITS OF 
A BANKRUPTCY JUDGE’S AUTHORITY TO DISBAND 
CHAPTER 11 COMMITTEES 
ABSTRACT 
When confronted with a misbehaving chapter 11 committee, bankruptcy 
courts have a limited list of remedies available to preserve equity. Universally, 
courts may address committee misbehavior through the disallowance of the 
committee’s attorneys’ fees, or through a modification of the committee’s 
membership. The collective acceptance of these remedies was the result of the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) of 2005. 
However, when these lesser remedies fail, the question of court authority 
becomes much more divisive. Recently, a split has emerged amongst the courts 
as to whether bankruptcy judges have the authority to use the “judicial hammer” 
of disbanding a misbehaving committee. 
This Comment argues that when a committee is engaged in severe 
misfeasance or malfeasance, bankruptcy judges must have the power to disband 
the committee. If a court determines that a less severe equitable remedy is 
insufficient to correct the misbehavior, only then should the bankruptcy judge 
proceed to disbanding the committee. Employing this Comment’s three-factor 
test, bankruptcy courts can assure that this last resort remedy remains the 
exception, not the rule. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Bankruptcy courts are split on judicial authority to disband chapter 11 
committees under the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act (“BAPCPA”).1 The issue, although litigated rarely, constitutes a 
fundamental dispute over the actual authority of judges to control the conduct of 
litigious parties. In this debate some courts take the position that judges may 
eliminate committees,2 while others ardently argue that Congress has delegated 
no such authority.3 Yet, the dominant position taken by courts that have 
mentioned the split is to take no side and to decide their specific cases on other 
grounds.4 As a result, the question of judicial committee disbandment has proven 
divisive enough to generate a circuit split, important enough to implicate a 
judge’s authority, and daunting enough to force a slew of courts to punt on the 
issue. 
This Comment argues that bankruptcy judges must have the authority to 
disband rogue committees for misfeasance or malfeasance. The reasons for this 
are twofold. First, rogue creditor committee misfeasance and malfeasance can 
unjustifiably harm the debtor-in-possession and the committee’s constituent 
creditors. When a committee breaches its fiduciary duties, it creates an 
opportunity for the financial abuse of the debtor-in-possession and negatively 
impacts the return to creditors. Second, the court’s 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) equitable 
powers should extend to disbanding a committee to allow the court to resolve 
inequities caused by rogue committees. This is evidenced by analogous 
exercises of § 105(a) court authority and parallels other court issued equitable 
remedies for party misbehavior. This Comment concludes by offering a three-
step factor test to aid bankruptcy judges in determining when a committee ought 
to be disbanded. 
 
 1 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 
(2005); In re City of Detroit, Mich., 519 B.R. 673, 680 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014); In re Pac. Ave., LLC, 467 
B.R. 868, 870 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2012); In re Dow Corning Corp., 194 B.R. 121, 131 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996), 
rev’d, 212 B.R. 258 (E.D. Mich. 1997); In re Caesars Entm’t Operating Co., Inc., 526 B.R. 265 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ill. 2015); In re New Life Fellowship, Inc., 202 B.R. 994, 997 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1996); In re JNL Funding 
Corp., 438 B.R. 356, 361 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Dewey & Leboeuf LLP, No. 12-12321 MG, 2012 WL 
5985325, at *5 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2012); In re Hearthstone Homes, Inc., No. BK12-80348-TLS, 2012 
WL 4027296, at *3 (Bankr. D. Neb. Sept. 12, 2012). 
 2 In re City of Detroit, Mich., 519 B.R. at 680; In re Pac. Ave., LLC, 467 B.R. at 870; In re Dow Corning 
Corp., 194 B.R. at 131. 
 3 In re Caesars Entm’t Operating Co., Inc., 526 B.R. 265; In re New Life Fellowship, Inc., 202 B.R. at 
997. 
 4  In re JNL Funding Corp., 438 B.R. at 361; In re Dewey & Leboeuf LLP, 2012 WL 5985325, at *5; In 
re Hearthstone Homes, Inc., 2012 WL 4027296, at *3. 
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This Comment begins with a discussion of the history of chapter 11 creditor 
committees. Such a discussion highlights the goals of Congress in creating 
creditor committees and demonstrates Congress’s thought process in balancing 
the equities between the debtor-in-possession and the creditors. Then the 
Comment defines a committee’s duties and discusses what effect an abdication 
of those duties can have on the debtor and on the committee’s co-creditors. Next, 
the Comment briefly describes the old circuit split regarding a judge’s authority 
to modify a committee prior to the passage of BAPCPA which settled that debate 
in 2005. This is followed by a discussion of the current circuit split concerning 
the disbandment of a committee. The Comment then clarifies the debate, 
presents real world examples of rogue committee abuses, offers analogous areas 
of court authority, and answers the procedural question implicated by judicial 
disbandment. Finally, the Comment proposes a factor test to resolve the circuit 
split and provide guidance to the courts moving forward. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Before deciding the question of a bankruptcy judge’s authority to disband a 
committee, it is necessary to understand the context surrounding the existence 
of committees and the responsibilities they have been assigned by Congress and 
the courts. This Section (1) describes the historical origins of chapter 11 
committees, (2) discusses the legislative history surrounding modern 
committees, and (3) precisely defines the duties assigned to chapter 11 
committees. This background reveals why Congress allowed committees to 
emerge, and contextualizes the misbehavior of committees that courts have 
disbanded. 
A. Origins of Chapter 11 Committees 
In a typical bankruptcy proceeding there are three represented parties. These 
parties are the debtor, the creditors, and the U.S. Trustee.5 Each of these parties 
play a unique and independently essential role in a bankruptcy proceeding. 
Typically, creditors solely bear the responsibility of advocating for their own 
financial interest.6 In doing so, creditors’ duties are wide ranging, including 
objecting to property being classified as exempt from the estate.7 On the other 
 
 5 See Bankruptcy Basics, BANKRUPTCY JUDGES DIVISION ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS 6 (3d. ed. Nov. 2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/bankbasics-post10172005. 
pdf. 
 6 See DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY: DEALING WITH FINANCIAL FAILURE FOR INDIVIDUALS 
AND BUSINESSES 28 (4th ed. 2015). 
 7 In re Banke, 267 B.R. 852, 854 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2001). 
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hand, debtors must cooperate with the U.S. Trustee as is necessary for the trustee 
to perform his or her statutory duties.8 
These “typical” bankruptcy proceedings are either chapter 7 or chapter 13 
filings. In 2016, of the 833,407 total bankruptcy filings, 825,587 were either 
chapter 7 or chapter 13 filings.9 As such, 99.06 percent of bankruptcy petitions 
filed in 2016 were under chapter 7 or chapter 13. In these cases, the creditors, 
debtor, and U.S. Trustee each play their usual roles and have their normal 
responsibilities. 
Statistically, chapter 11 filings are rare, accounting for only 0.88 percent of 
all bankruptcy filings.10 Importantly, in a chapter 11 case, the interested parties 
to the litigation are different, and their roles are unique, from that of the typical 
bankruptcy. These parties to a chapter 11 proceeding are the debtor-in-
possession and the creditor committees.11 Unlike in a chapter 7, a chapter 11 
debtor remains in possession of his/her/its property. The debtor-in-possession 
steps into the shoes of the trustee by administering the property of the estate.12 
While there are still creditors in a chapter 11, these creditors uniquely have the 
opportunity to form committees.13 
Creditor committees are created by the U.S. Trustee and normally consist of 
seven of the debtor’s largest creditors.14 The responsibilities of the creditor 
committee are varied, but generally require acting in the interests of the 
constituent creditors represented by the committee.15 To fulfill these duties, 
creditor committees may hire attorneys, accountants, or any other agents who 
would aid the committee in performing these aforementioned duties.16 
Importantly, the cost of hiring these professionals is considered an 
 
 8 In re Marve, 43 F. App’x 943, 945 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 9 March 2017 Bankruptcy Filings Down 4.7 Percent, UNITED STATES COURTS (Published April 19, 
2017) http://www.uscourts.gov/news/2017/04/19/march-2017-bankruptcy-filings-down-47-percent. 
 10 See id. Accounting for the year of 2017 only. This number is a decrease from the amount of chapter 
11’s filed in 2016. 
 11 See 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b). 
 12 Id. § 1107 (Rights, powers, and duties of debtor in possession). 
 13 Id. § 1102(a)(1). 
 14 Id. § 1102. 
 15 Id. § 1103(c) (These duties generally include consulting with the debtor-in-possession, investigating 
the acts, conduct, financial liability, and operations of the debtor and his or her business, participating in the 
formulation of a plan, collecting creditor acceptances or rejections of a plan, in rare instances requesting the 
appointment of a chapter 11 trustee). 
 16 Id. § 1103(a). 
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“Administrative Expense” and, to the extent allowed, must be paid in full by the 
debtor-in-possession prior to confirmation of the plan.17 
Creditor committees began to see regular use in 1934 after Congress passed 
§ 77B of the Bankruptcy Act. This allowed a two-thirds majority consensus of 
each creditor class to force the adoption of a repayment plan that scaled down 
the debtor’s obligations.18 This provision created a wave of gamesmanship 
between creditors that precipitated the advent of “insider” committees of 
creditors.19 These “insider” committees worked with debtors to create coalitions 
of creditors that could force “insider favorable” plans through to confirmation.20 
In response to these “insider” committees, “protective” committees formed to 
negotiate with, and act as a check on, the “insider” committees.21 
This remained the case until the Chandler Act of 1938. The Chandler Act 
created chapter X and chapter XI as two separate forms of business 
reorganization.22 Chapter X was intended for large businesses and, in response 
to the gamesmanship of § 77B, eliminated “insider” creditor control by the 
appointment of a disinterested trustee.23 Chapter XI, on the other hand, was 
intended for small businesses, allowed for the debtor to remain in possession, 
and provided for the creditors to jointly elect a committee to represent their 
interests.24 
The creation of protective committees for non-insider unsecured creditors 
was a necessary maneuver due to the realities of bankruptcy disbursements. 
According to the Administrative Agency of U.S. Courts, between 1965 and 1968 
creditors received sixteen percent of the total amount of claims on debtor assets 
in liquidation bankruptcies.25 Of this, secured creditors received sixty-six cents 
on the dollar despite accounting for only eleven percent of allowed claims.26 
Priority unsecured creditors, accounting for only nine percent of claims, 
 
 17 In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., 508 B.R. 283, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 18 See 73 P.L. 296, 48 Stat. 911, 73 Cong. Ch. 424 § 77B (1934). 
 19 Daniel J. Bussel, Coalition-Building Through Bankruptcy Creditors’ Committees, 43 UCLA L. REV. 
1547, 1556 (1996). 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. at 1557. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. at 1558. 
 25 BRUCE G. CARRUTHERS & TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, RESCUING BUSINESS 314 (Oxford University Press 
1998). Between 1965 and 1968 the total monetary amount of claims on a debtor’s estate assets totaled on average 
$431,000,000 per year. Of this total, only $70,000,000 were received by creditors. 
 26 Id. 
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recovered thirty-five cents on the dollar.27 Yet, unsecured creditors, who 
accounted for eighty percent of all claims on estate assets, received only seven 
cents on the dollar.28 
This dramatic discrepancy was not unique to liquidation bankruptcies, and 
indeed was similarly present in corporate reformations. According to a 
Brookings Institute report, in chapter XI reorganizations roughly sixty percent 
of an average corporation’s debt was issued by unsecured creditors.29 Despite 
this, secured creditors were paid eighty percent of the time and recovered thirty-
one cents on the dollar.30 Priority creditors recovered thirty-six percent of their 
claims, yet non-priority unsecured creditors only managed to get forty-four 
percent of their claims categorized as allowed claims.31 Of these, unsecured 
creditors only received a meager eight cents on the dollar.32 Given these historic 
realities, it is not surprising that committees emerged as a means of protecting 
creditor interests. 
Additionally, while the Chandler Act created official creditor committees, it 
offered little respite from the expenses associated with committee operation. As 
Justice Douglas noted in Dickinson Indus. Site v. Cowan,33 the Chandler Act 
allowed for the compensation of committee members, but made similar 
compensation difficult for committee professionals.34 Under the Chandler Act, 
if a professional wanted compensation he or she would receive it only at the rate 
that the “economy of administration” required.35 The “economy of 
administration” standard dictated that professionals could only be paid if 
creditors were first paid in full, which had the effect of forcing bankruptcy 
attorney rates to be below what they could earn in a different practice area.36 
This restriction created an incentive for qualified professionals to avoid 
representing creditor committees. 
 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 CARRUTHERS & HALLIDAY, supra note 25 at 314. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 309 U.S. 382 (1940). 
 34 Dickinson Indus. Site v. Cowan, 309 U.S. 382, 388–89 (1940) (quoting Chandler Act. Sec. 249, 11 
U.S.C. § 649). 
 35 Albert Togut & Lauren L. Peacock, The Growth of Modern Practice Evolution of Bankruptcy Practice 
Before the Code to Today, 35 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 24 (Oct. 2016). 
 36 Id. 
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B. Legislative History of the Modern Bankruptcy Code 
The bifurcated chapter X and chapter XI approach to business reorganization 
endured until Congress decided to more broadly balance the equities of 
corporate bankruptcies in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. The Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978 melded together chapter X and chapter XI into chapter 11.37 
The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act demonstrated a knowledge 
of the bifurcated past of business reorganization, and noticeably used language 
indicating a preference for the approach taken in chapter XI.38 Reflecting this 
preference, Congress created chapter 11 to permit debtors to remain in 
possession of their assets.39 Congress also adopted, and expanded on, the idea of 
committee involvement in chapter XI by expressly permitting multiple 
committees in chapter 11 filings.40 Moreover, Congress chose to more generally 
describe a committee’s role in the administration of a case, stating: 
The supervisory functions of the committees will be diminished, due 
to the existence of the United States Trustee. They will primarily be 
negotiating bodies for the classes of creditors that they represent. As 
such, it is important that they be representative of their respective 
classes, and not chosen by attorneys for creditors that seek the position 
of counsel to the committee.41  
Thus, in 1978 Congress took the initiative to loosely define the intended role of 
the creditor committee in chapter 11 filings. 
In 1978 the House version of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, H.R. 8200, was 
introduced to the House of Representatives.42 H.R. 8200 empowered the court 
to appoint one or more committees to represent unsecured creditors in business 
reorganizations.43 It also switched attorney compensation from the old 
“economy of administration” standard to a “cost of comparable services” 
standard.44 H.R. 8200 received a warm reception and was passed by the House.45 
The Senate’s version was S. 2266, and reflected the Senate’s choice to 
protect creditors in a different way than H.R. 8200 proposed. Notably, unlike the 
 
 37 Bussel, supra note 19 at 1559. 
 38 H.R. Rep. 95-595, 91, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6052. 
 39 H.R. Rep. 95-595, 104, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6065. 
 40 H.R. Rep. 95-595, 104, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6065. 
 41 H.R. Rep. 95-595, 104, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6065. 
 42 CARRUTHERS & HALLIDAY, supra note 25 at 324. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Matter of Hamilton Hardware Co., Inc., 11 B.R. 326, 328 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1981), aff’d sub nom. In 
re Hamilton Hardware Co., Inc., 8 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 667 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 11, 1981). 
 45 CARRUTHERS & HALLIDAY, supra note 25 at 325. 
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House bill, the Senate bill sought to maintain the Chandler Act’s “economy of 
administration” standard of attorney compensation.46 On July 14, 1978, S. 2266 
was reported out of the Senate Judiciary committee, and a modified version of 
the bill was later enacted as the final Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.47 
One of the important modifications to the Senate bill was the adoption of 
H.R. 8200’s switch from compensating creditor committee attorneys at the 
“economy of administration” to compensation at the “cost of comparable 
services.”48 This meant that for the first time, bankruptcy attorneys could be paid 
at 100 percent the cost of their rate; making such a practice comparable in 
profitability to corporate work.49 This aspect of the Bankruptcy Reform Act 
therefore served to attract qualified professionals to committee representation. 
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 also produced the first version of the 
modern Bankruptcy Code,50 and the Code concretely established the right of 
creditors to committee representation.51 Section 503 of the Bankruptcy Code 
created specified allowances for certain costs to be classified as “Administrative 
Expenses.”52 One of those costs that the debtor was mandated to pay was the 
“actual, necessary services” rendered by professionals employed to represent a 
party in a bankruptcy proceeding.53 The purpose of this was to eliminate the 
arbitrary limit on the fees that the committee’s attorney could demand.54 After 
1978, not only were committee attorneys being paid at competitive rates, but 
additionally, the debtor was wholly responsible for footing the bill. 
Consequently, Congress ended the debate over how creditors could be 
represented in a corporate reformation, but left open the discussion over how 
courts ought to police committees once they are formed. 
C. Defining a Committee’s Duties 
Discussing the appropriate remedial measures for committee misfeasance 
and malfeasance requires an understanding of what a committee’s duties are in 
a chapter 11 case. Committees have express duties to their creditor constituency 
 
 46 Matter of Hamilton Hardware Co., Inc., 11 B.R. 326, 328 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1981) (“The Senate did 
not intend to change existing law.”). 
 47 CARRUTHERS & HALLIDAY, supra note 25 at 327. 
 48 Togut & Peacock, supra note 35. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Charles J. Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 
5, 32 (1995). 
 51 11 U.S.C. § 1102. 
 52 Id. § 503. 
 53 Id. § 330(a)(1). 
 54 Matter of Hamilton Hardware Co., Inc., 11 B.R. 326, 329 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1981). 
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and implied duties to the debtor. The committee’s duties to their co-creditors 
arise from their judicially established fiduciary duties and out of § 1103 of the 
Bankruptcy Code; the committee’s implicit duties to the debtor arise out of Rule 
9011(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. These duties help to 
contextualize what is meant by committee misfeasance and malfeasance. 
The fiduciary duty a committee has to its constituent creditors is fundamental 
and defined by undivided loyalty and impartial service to all creditors 
represented.55 The committee’s fiduciary duties differ from that of the corporate 
fiduciary, because the committee is bound not only to serving its co-creditors, 
but also to safeguarding the bankruptcy process.56 This stems from the fact that 
membership on a committee is not intended to grant financial advantages to any 
one creditor over his or her co-creditors.57 Importantly, a breach of a 
committee’s fiduciary duty can even extend to the committee’s mishandling of 
non-estate property.58 
Additionally, § 1103 of the Bankruptcy Code imposes a statutory duty upon 
committees to protect the interests of their co-creditors.59 Despite its use of the 
permissive “may,” § 1103 has been read to establish a non-exhaustive list of 
duties a committee is bound to with respect to its co-creditors.60 Because of this, 
§ 1103 establishes that a committee has a duty to act as a “watchdog” for the 
interests of its co-creditors.61 If a § 1103 power is needed to protect the creditors’ 
interests, the committee must exercise that power.62 This means that if a 
committee’s actions harm the interests of co-creditors, the committee has 
abdicated its duty and has committed an act of either misfeasance or 
malfeasance. 
Conversely, while a committee bears no express duties to the debtor,63 a 
committee does have duties with respect to the Court.64 Rule 9011(b)(1) states, 
in pertinent part: 
By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or 
later advocating) a petition, pleading, written motion, or other paper, 
 
 55 In re Fas Mart Convenience Stores, Inc., 265 B.R. 427, 432 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2001). 
 56 Westmoreland Human Opportunities, Inc. v. Walsh, 327 B.R. 561, 573 (W.D. Pa. 2005). 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. at 570. 
 59 See 11 U.S.C. § 1103. 
 60 Matter of Advisory Comm. of Major Funding Corp., 109 F.3d 219, 224 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 In re Seaescape Cruises, Ltd., 131 B.R. 241, 243 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991). 
 64 In re Mesta Mach. Co., 67 B.R. 151, 158 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986). 
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an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that . . . it is not being 
presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause 
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.65 
Because committees are directly funded by the debtor, their malicious stalling 
may needlessly increase the costs of litigation.66 In view of this, committees 
possess an implicit duty to not waste the debtor’s resources. Put another way, 
committees have an obligation to the court to not abuse the bankruptcy process 
in any way that would unjustly prejudice the debtor. Notably, the express 
authority of the bankruptcy court to sanction a party for violating its Rule 9011 
duties does not establish the outer bounds of judicial remedies available to 
judges in addressing the abdication of those duties.67 Thus, once a duty has been 
established, the court may use its broad equitable powers to punish a party’s 
abdication of said duty.68 Here, this means that the court has broad equitable 
authority to correct committee misbehavior with respect to the debtor. 
When a committee has breached either its duties to constituent creditors or 
to the debtor, that committee is “rogue”. A rogue committee is defined by the 
misfeasance and malfeasance that the committee may engage in. A rogue 
committee’s abandonment of its duties can be grave, and unjustifiably harm the 
interests of the debtor and co-creditors. 
II. HARMS CAUSED BY ROGUE COMMITTEES 
The issue of committee misfeasance or malfeasance is not a legal question 
without practical significance. On the contrary, committee misbehavior can 
severely damage the interests of all parties to the bankruptcy, and can cause 
sizeable inequities. In this Section, the Comment first discusses the harms rogue 
committees can do to the debtor. Second, this Section discusses the damage 
rogue committees can do to the creditors. The purpose of this Section is to 
illustrate the severity of rogue committee misfeasance or malfeasance, and to 
provide context for litigants’ motions for judicial committee disbandment. 
 
 65 FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
 66 See 11 U.S.C. § 330 (a)(1). 
 67 See Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 324 (2d Cir. 1980) (J. Mansfield, Dissenting), aff’d sub nom. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982) (“Congress is not under any duty to state 
that the various remedies provided by it are exclusive, much less to disavow or disassociate itself from prior 
lower court decisions as if they were statutes enacted by it.”). 
 68 In re Xpedior Inc., 354 B.R. 210, 238 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006) (“[T]he equitable tools found under 11 
U.S.C. § 105(a) can be exercised to carry out bankruptcy duties and jurisdiction.”). 
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A. How Rogue Committees Harm the Debtor 
Rogue creditor committees can unjustifiably harm debtors by weaponizing 
their professional’s fees as administrative expenses. The term “Administrative 
Expenses” is not defined in § 503 of the Bankruptcy Code; however, an 
“Administrative Expense” is commonly understood to refer to such expenses 
that are (1) generated after the start of the bankruptcy case, and (2) incurred in 
an effort to benefit the estate.69 Those expenses which are categorized as 
“Administrative Expenses” are given second priority under § 507(a), and as such 
must be paid in full on the effective date of the plan.70 
In chapter 11 proceedings, creditor committees are permitted to hire 
professionals to represent the committee and advance the creditors’ interests.71 
Section 330(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code provides for reasonable compensation 
for the services of professionals employed to represent a party in a bankruptcy 
proceeding.72 These fees and expenses of professionals are considered 
“Administrative Expenses” under § 503 of the Bankruptcy Code.73 As such, all 
of the expenses the creditor committee incurs, as well as all the fees and expenses 
charged by the committee’s professionals, are paid with money from the chapter 
11 debtor’s estate.74 
The professionals that serve a committee answer, and report exclusively, to 
the committee itself.75 Attorneys representing a committee and the creditor 
committee operate under attorney-client privilege.76 This privilege bars the U.S. 
Trustee and the court from directing or otherwise involving themselves with the 
committee’s attorney.77 To the extent that the court may police committee 
professionals, it is largely via the court’s authority to determine the 
reasonableness of committee professional fees.78 Yet, even this limited power is 
reduced in effect by § 330, which only requires that attorney’s fees reflect 
 
 69 In re Midway Airlines Corp., 406 F.3d 229, 237 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 70 In re Sanders, 341 B.R. 47, 50 (Bankr. N.D. Ala.), aff’d, 347 B.R. 776 (N.D. Ala. 2006); 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1129(a)(9)(A). 
 71 Matter of UNR Indus., Inc., 736 F.2d 1136, 1139 (7th Cir. 1984); see also Matter of Advisory Comm. 
of Major Funding Corp., 109 F.3d 219, 224 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting In re AKF Foods, Inc., 36 B.R. 288, 289 
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984)); 11 U.S.C. § 1103(a). 
 72 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1). 
 73 First Merchants Acceptance Corp. v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 198 F.3d 394, 398 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 74 Listecki v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors, 780 F.3d 731, 739 (7th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 136 
S. Ct. 581, 193 L. Ed. 2d 464 (2015). 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 In re Tribeca Mkt., LLC, 516 B.R. 254, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
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decisions made by the attorney which were reasonable at the time, expressly 
rejecting an “actual benefit” test.79 What’s more, using the “loadstar method,” 
many courts have adopted a “strong presumption” that an attorney’s fee is 
reasonable insofar as it is calculated by merely multiplying the hours reasonably 
worked by the attorney’s hourly rate.80 
In retaining these professionals, committees often put a great financial strain 
on a debtor-in-possession’s ability to create a viable plan of reorganization. On 
average, bankruptcy attorneys account for almost half of the total cost of chapter 
11 cases.81 Much of these costs arise because of the length of time that a chapter 
11 case normally takes. Empirical studies show that the mean chapter 11 case 
lasts for 437 days,82 with a shorter case typically lasting 136 days and a longer 
case typically lasting 672 days.83 Empirical studies have indicated that debtors’ 
lead counsel alone can bill an average of 1,725.5 hours per case.84 In these cases, 
the mean hourly rate charged by the debtor’s counsel was $290.54.85 
Consequently, the average chapter 11 lead counsel alone billed their client 
$501,326.77 per case, at an average cost of roughly $1,147.20 per day.86 
The mean chapter 11 debtor has only $4,300,000 in total assets.87 Of these 
assets, the median debtor in Boston and Atlanta entered bankruptcy with only 
 
 79 In re Woerner, 783 F.3d 266, 274 (5th Cir. 2015). The “actual benefit” test only permitted bankruptcy 
attorneys to be compensated for the “actual, necessary services” rendered by the attorney and would force the 
court to independently determine the actual value of the work done. 
 80 In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc., 133 B.R. 13, 22 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991) (quoting 
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 564 (1986), supplemented, 483 
U.S. 711 (1987)). 
 81 Stephen J. Lubben, The Chapter 11 Attorneys, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 447, 471 (2012). 
 82 Stephen P. Ferris & Robert M. Lawless, The Expenses of Financial Distress: The Direct Costs of 
Chapter 11, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 629, 637 (2000). 
 83 Lynn M. LoPuckie & Joseph W. Doherty, Professional Overcharging in large Bankruptcy 
Reorganization Cases, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 983, 1003 (2008). The lower limit for shorter cases and 
higher limit for longer cases being determined by measuring one standard deviation from the mean case length. 
 84 Stephen J. Lubben, Corporate Reorganization & Professional Fees, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 77, 95 (2008) 
[hereinafter Lubben, Corporate Reorganization]. This study also indicated that, within its sample of 1,026 
chapter 11 cases filed in 2004, the average number of billable hours spent for “big cases” by the lead debtor’s 
counsel increased to 5,026.7 hours per case. 
 85 Lubben, Corporate Reorganization, supra note 84 at 98. 
 86 These costs only account for the costs of the lead debtors counsel and are the product of a mathematical 
calculation, multiplying the average number of hours billed and the average billing rate indicated in Lubben’s 
2004 study. This number was divided by the mean number of days a chapter 11 case lasts to arrive at the 
aforementioned average daily cost. As a special note, the mean number of days was taken from a separate study 
conducted by Stephen Ferris. See Ferris & Lawless, supra note 82. It is also worth noting that this calculation 
does not account for the $98,000 average monthly expense that “big cases” were authorized to pay for other 
debtor professionals. See Lubben, Corporate Reorganization, supra note 84 at 96. 
 87 Ferris & Lawless, supra note 82, at 640 (Noting that the median chapter 11 debtor had even less, at 
only $700,000 in total assets, thus suggesting a wide variation in the wealth of chapter 11 debtors.). 
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one percent of their total assets classifiable as liquid.88 This money had to be 
used, in part, to pay creditor committee professionals’ fees as well as the debtor’s 
own professional expenses. According to a study of twelve chapter 11 cases 
from 2000, the mean cost of a creditor committee’s professionals was 
$393,689.61 over the life of the case.89 Moreover, professional fees and 
expenses have risen at a rate of roughly 10.4 percent per year, outpacing 
increases in consumer prices by fifty-seven percent.90 As such, it is unsurprising 
that only seventeen percent of chapter 11 debtors can afford to make it to 
confirmation.91 
Cases with multiple creditor committees, however, are relatively rare. A 
2004 study of 1,050 chapter 11 cases showed that creditor committees were used 
in roughly sixty-seven percent of “big cases.”92 Of these, ten percent of “big 
cases” utilized multiple creditor committees.93 Within all cases where a creditor 
committee was used, seventy-eight percent of the committees elected to hire 
professionals.94 As a result, increases in debtor size did not insulate debtors from 
the effect of increased committee professional expenses. 
Making the reasonable assumption that creditor committee attorney’s bill 
similarly to their debtor counterparts, it is easy to see how a rogue committee 
can weaponize their professionals. Doubling the daily cost of an attorney (to 
account for there being one debtor’s counsel and one committee’s counsel) 
would result in a total cost to the debtor of $2,294.40 per day. For the average 
chapter 11 debtor this is manageable; however, if there is a third “rogue” 
committee, retaining one attorney, the daily expenses increase to $3,441.60. 
Using these averages, it would take 1,874 days to burn through all of the average 
debtor’s assets with one committee, but only 1,249 days to do so with two 
committees. While in most cases multiple committees are justified and necessary 
to represent varied creditors, the extreme cost of committee representation 
demands that judges take the risk of fee weaponization seriously. 
 
 88 Id. at 641. 
 89 Stephen J. Lubben, The Direct Costs of Corporate Reorganization: An Empirical Examination of 
Professional Fees in Large Chapter 11 Cases, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 509, 530 (2000). 
 90 LoPuckie & Doherty, supra note 83, at 985.  
 91 Susan Jensen-Conklin, Financial Reporting by Chapter 11 Debtors: An Introduction to Statement of 
Position 90-7, 66 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 35 (1992). 
 92 Lubben, Corporate Reorganization, supra note 84 at 94. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Lubben, Corporate Reorganization, supra note 84 at 97. 
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B. How Rogue Committees Can Harm the Creditors 
Rogue committees can harm debtors and the creditors which they purport to 
protect. First, rogue committees, through resignations and removals, can harm 
creditors by changing their membership such that they no longer adequately 
represent creditors. Second, rogue committees can harm creditors by reducing 
the value of the estate to their co-creditors. 
1. Rogue Creditor Committees May Fail to Represent Creditors 
Creditor committees may become unrepresentative of the creditor classes for 
which they purport to advocate, thus necessitating committee disbandment. 
While at their inception creditor committees may be appropriately 
representative, as time goes on, they can become unrepresentative. This is often 
due to creditor fatigue or due to certain creditors believing they can get a better 
deal outside of bankruptcy. At times, these vacancies on committees cannot be 
filled in such a way that will preserve the representative nature of the committee. 
Where an unfillable vacancy exists, calling into question the adequacy of the 
committee’s representation, justice requires that the judge have the discretion to 
disband the broken committee. 
One of the most obvious ways that a vacancy could emerge on a committee 
is if a creditor resigns. Creditors are entitled, by statute, to resign from creditor 
committees that they no longer wish to serve. Section 1102 specifically provides 
that creditor committees will consist of “the persons, willing to serve . . . .”95 
Courts have interpreted this language to mean that creditors cannot be forced to 
serve, or remain, on a committee.96 As such, it is possible that a creditor may 
resign from a committee, leaving no other creditors who are willing to fill the 
void. 
This situation may seem odd on its face; however, evidence indicates that 
the longer a chapter 11 bankruptcy goes on, the more “creditor fatigue” sets in.97 
“Creditor fatigue” means that the creditor has lost interest in the proceeding or 
that the case has become too resource intensive for the creditor to continue to 
play an active role.98 This creditor fatigue can result in cases in which no creditor 
 
 95 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
 96 In re Schatz Fed. Bearings Co., Inc., 11 B.R. 363, 365 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
 97 Peter C. Blain, The Increase in Prepackaged Chapter 11s: An Immediate Look at the Legal, 
Governmental, and Economic Ramifications of the Resurgence of Prepackaged Bankruptcy Plans, 2008 
ASPATORE SPECIAL REP. 7 (2008). 
 98 James M. Lloyd, UK/CLE DEBTOR/CREDITOR RELATIONS IN KENTUCKY § 3.33(c) (2011). 
GENSBURGCOMMENTPROOFS_7.11.19 7/11/2019 10:13 AM 
2019] ROGUE COMMITTEES OR ROGUE JUDGES 615 
is willing to fill a committee vacancy because, in short, the creditor has more 
important things to do.99 
Additionally, committee vacancies may be created by the U.S. Trustee 
removing a creditor from a committee.100 One cause for such a removal may be 
a determination by the U.S. Trustee that the creditor’s claim was no longer 
properly representative of the classes he or she represented.101 Alternatively, the 
U.S. Trustee may discover a creditor’s breach of his or her fiduciary duty, which 
mandates removal of the creditor from the committee.102 In fact, courts have 
previously held that the U.S. Trustee is required to remove a creditor from a 
committee if there is merely the appearance of a breach of the committee 
member’s fiduciary duties.103 
When the class of creditors being represented is small, this may leave the 
U.S. Trustee with no viable replacements.104 Whether it is caused by a 
resignation or a removal, vacancies often emerge in creditor committees. 
Evidence indicates that roughly one in four creditor committees will experience 
either a creditor resignation or removal.105 In these situations, it is not enough 
that there exists a creditor who is willing to serve on the committee to fill the 
vacancy. Vacancies on committees may not be filled by significant business 
competitors of the debtor,106 nor may they be filled by converting the committee 
into a “blended committee” of equity holders and creditors.107 
2. Rogue Creditor Committees Reduce the Value of the Estate to Other 
Creditors 
Rogue committees further threaten creditors by harming the value of the 
debtor’s estate, thereby reducing the funds available to co-creditors. While 
 
 99 See generally id. 
 100 In re Am. W. Airlines, 142 B.R. 901, 902 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1992). 
 101 Id. at 903. 
 102 In re Fas Mart Convenience Stores, Inc., 265 B.R. 427, 432 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2001). 
 103 In re Venturelink Holdings, Inc., 299 B.R. 420, 423 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003) (“The court adds that the 
appearance of a breach of that fiduciary duty should likewise mandate the removal [of a creditor from a 
committee]. The bankruptcy process must both be fair and appear fair.”). 
 104 See, e.g., Brief of Appellant, Nos. C03-1272L, C03-1273L, 2003 WL 23952673 n.9 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 
22, 2003) (arguing that the appointment of a committee containing only one legitimate creditor indicated that 
the committee should be disbanded). 
 105 Michelle M. Harner, Committee Capture? An Empirical Analysis of the Role of Creditors’ Committees 
in Business Reorganizations, 64 VAND. L. REV. 749, 798 (2011). 
 106 In re Wilson Foods Corp., 31 B.R. 272, 272 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983). 
 107 In re Mercury Fin. Co., 224 B.R. 380, 387 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1998), opinion supplemented on denial of 
reconsideration (Aug. 28, 1998), aff’d, 240 B.R. 270 (N.D. Ill. 1999). 
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committees bear a fiduciary duty to their co-creditors, such a fiduciary duty 
becomes meaningless if committee members are few and the replacement of bad 
members is impossible. Consequently, if a committee is harming the value of 
the estate for its co-creditors, and member replacement is not possible, then the 
bankruptcy judge must have the authority to disband the rogue committee. 
On the most basic level, excessive committee professional fees reduce the 
available return general unsecured creditors can receive in the bankruptcy.108 By 
increasing their fees, committee professionals are empowered by § 330 to drain 
the available assets of the debtor-in-possession, which naturally causes the 
distribution to unsecured creditors to disintegrate.109 This harm to unsecured 
creditors is evidenced by the fees incurred in In re Texaco, Inc.,110 in which the 
industry committee incurred professional’s fees of roughly $125,000 per month, 
thus potentially reducing the assets available for the unsecured creditors by 
$7,000,000 over the life of the bankruptcy.111 Another case study in the 
destructive potential of committees to unsecured creditors is In re Zale Corp.,112 
where five separate committees incurred over $500,000 per week.113 Such 
excessive fees drained directly from the debtor company and threatened any 
return to unsecured creditors by increasing the likelihood of conversion to 
chapter 7. 
Moreover, rogue committees can deal serious harm to the debtor’s secured 
creditors. This is because, often, committee professionals are paid out of the cash 
collateral of a secured creditor.114 In these instances, the longer the committee 
operates, and the more fees the committee bills, the more harm is done to secured 
creditors. What is more, such use of cash collateral may be ordered by the court 
over the specific objection of the secured creditor, whose interest in the estate is 
being jeopardized.115 While using cash collateral requires adequate protection of 
the secured creditor’s interest, adequate protection is not a guarantee of payment, 
which means the use of cash collateral potentially reduces the secured creditor’s 
 
 108 Harvey R. Miller, The Changing Face of Chapter 11: A Reemergence of the Bankruptcy Judge as 
Producer, Director, and Sometimes Star of the Reorganization Passion Play, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 431, 461 
(1995). 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id.; In re Texaco Inc., 79 B.R. 560 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
 111 Miller, supra note 108; 79 B.R. 560. 
 112 Jewel Recovery, L.P. v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom (In re Zale Corp.), NO. 392-30001-
SAF-11, 1996 Bankr. LEXIS 1933 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1996). 
 113 Miller, supra note 108, at 462; 1996 Bankr. LEXIS 1933. 
 114 See In re Las Torres Dev., L.L.C., 413 B.R. 687, 699 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009). 
 115 See In re Proalert, LLC, 314 B.R. 436, 438 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004). 
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security interest.116 Thus, runaway fees incurred by runaway committees not 
only harm the interests of the unsecured creditors, but also those creditors who 
are ostensibly protected by a security interest. 
III. COURTS AND THE COMMITTEES 
The split over a bankruptcy judge’s authority to disband a committee did not 
emerge overnight. Rather, the legal dispute is the product of an often unclear 
Bankruptcy Code and a long history of court uncertainty pertaining to 
committees. This Section begins by first describing the pre-BAPCPA circuit 
split over a bankruptcy judge’s authority to modify committee membership. 
Second, this Section describes how the modern split was foreshadowed in the 
old split. Third, this Section details the modern split over a bankruptcy judge’s 
ability to disband a committee. The goal of this Section is not to merely describe 
the current split in case-law, but instead it is to contextualize the debate as an 
evolution of old arguments adapted to fit within the new, post-BAPCPA, 
Bankruptcy Code. 
A. History of Courts Defining Their Powers to Alter Committees 
Historically, courts have had trouble defining their powers to alter, or 
otherwise affect, chapter 11 creditor committees. Prior to the passage of the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (“BAPCPA”) in 
2005, there was a circuit split concerning the authority of a bankruptcy judge to 
alter the membership of an existing creditor committee. In this split, many 
districts held that § 1102 of the Bankruptcy Code did not confer to the court any 
authority to review committee decisions made by the U.S. Trustee as it pertains 
to committee membership.117 Other districts, however, held that the court did 
have the authority to alter the membership of a committee.118 
Courts that believed that a bankruptcy judge was able to affect the 
membership of a committee did not share a uniform line of the reasoning. Some 
 
 116 See In re Elliott Leases Cars, Inc., 20 B.R. 893, 896 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1982). 
 117 See In re Wheeler Tech., Inc., 139 B.R. 235, 239 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1992); In re Dow Corning Corp., 212 
B.R. 258, 264 (E.D. Mich. 1997); In re Victory Markets, Inc., 196 B.R. 1, 5 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1995); In re 
Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc., 118 B.R. 209, 210 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990); Matter of Gates Eng’g Co., 
Inc., 104 B.R. 653, 654 (Bankr. D. Del. 1989); In re Hills Stores Co., 137 B.R. 4, 8 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
 118 See In re Mercury Fin. Co., 224 B.R. 380, 385 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1998), opinion supplemented on denial 
of reconsideration (Aug. 28, 1998), aff’d, 240 B.R. 270 (N.D. Ill. 1999); In re Fas Mart Convenience Stores, 
Inc., 265 B.R. 427, 431 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2001); In re Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., No. 4:96CV396, 1997 
WL 155407, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 21, 1997); In re Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., Inc., 200 B.R. 933, 940 (M.D. Fla. 
1996). 
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courts held that Rule 2020 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure gave 
judges the inherent authority to affect the membership of a committee.119 Others 
believed that the equitable powers conveyed to the court by § 105(a) implied 
judicial review of committee membership.120 Still others maintained that the 
absence of an express prohibition against judicial review in the legislative 
history, in conjunction with § 1102(b)(1), gave bankruptcy judges the authority 
to alter committee membership.121 Some courts even went so far as to hold that 
this authority grew primarily from a common law presumption of judicial 
reviewability.122 While fragmented in their reasoning, these courts were uniform 
in their belief that such authority was not only present but obvious and inherent 
as a power of the bankruptcy judge. 
The reasoning adopted by the courts on the other side of the spilt, which held 
that the bankruptcy judge had no power to alter committee membership, was 
more uniform. These courts universally believed that the statutory silence of 
§ 1102 should be read to mean that Congress never contemplated allowing 
bankruptcy judges to alter committee membership.123 Additionally, these courts 
reasoned that the repeal of § 1102(c) in 1986 was an express statement by 
Congress that bankruptcy judges were barred from altering committee 
membership.124 The courts which denied bankruptcy judges the power to affect 
committees were nearly unanimous in the reasons why they did so. 
However, despite the uniform reasoning of the courts denying jurisdiction, 
and the highly fragmented reasoning in support of granting judges such 
authority, in 2005 Congress settled the dispute in favor of judicial review.125 In 
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, Congress 
expressly provided that: 
On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the 
court may order the United States trustee to change the membership of 
a committee appointed under this subsection, if the court determines 
that the change is necessary to ensure adequate representation of 
 
 119 See In re Mercury Fin. Co., 224 B.R. at 384, opinion supplemented on denial of reconsideration (Aug. 
28, 1998), aff’d, 240 B.R. 270 (N.D. Ill. 1999). 
 120 See In re Fas Mart Convenience Stores, Inc., 265 B.R. at 431. 
 121 See In re Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., No. 4:96CV396, 1997 WL 155407, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 
21, 1997). 
 122 See In re Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., Inc., 200 B.R. 933, 939 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (“There is a strong 
presumption that Congress intends judicial review of administrative action.”). 
 123 See In re Dow Corning Corp., 212 B.R. at 264. 
 124 See In re Wheeler Tech., Inc., 139 B.R. 235, 238–39 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1992); see also In re Victory 
Markets, Inc., 196 B.R. 1, 5 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1995). 
 125 See In re ShoreBank Corp., 467 B.R. 156, 160 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2012). 
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creditors or equity security holders. The court may order the United 
States trustee to increase the number of members of a committee to 
include a creditor that is a small business concern.126 
The language used by Congress in § 1102(a)(4) was intentionally clear and 
expressly addressed the confusion created by the prior circuit split. 
B. Foreshadowing the Debate 
Prior to the passage of BAPCPA, the split over disbanding a committee was 
argued within the context of this old debate about a judge’s power to modify 
committees. The cases of In re Dow Corning Corp. and In re New Life 
Fellowship are emblematic of the peripheral manner in which the debate was 
foreshadowed. 
The decision of In re Dow Corning Corp. was issued in 1996.127 The central 
issue litigated in Dow Corning was whether the court could issue an order 
modifying the composition of various creditor committees involved in the 
case.128 Multiple creditors filed motions to the court to modify the composition 
of the committee due to fears that they would not be adequately represented 
otherwise.129 On this issue, the court determined that it did have the authority to 
modify the composition of the committee.130 The court reasoned that, because 
the U.S. Trustee had no express power to modify committees, this statutory void 
in power had to be filled by the court’s § 105(a) equitable powers.131 
However, in dicta, the Dow Corning court went further and determined that, 
if necessary, the court could also disband a committee.132 To support this 
conclusion, the court argued that FRBP Rule 2007 empowered the court to 
disband committees.133 The court argued that, because Rule 2007 permitted the 
court to vacate the appointment of a committee if it failed to satisfy 
§ 1102(b)(1)’s requirements, the court had the authority to disband that 
committee.134 The court reasoned that because (1) the U.S. Trustee was fallible 
and could make mistakes in creating a committee, and (2) the Advisory 
 
 126 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(4). 
 127 See generally In re Dow Corning Corp., 194 B.R. 121 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996), rev’d, 212 B.R. 258 
(E.D. Mich. 1997). 
 128 In re Dow Corning Corp., 194 B.R. at 126. 
 129 Id. at 127–28. 
 130 Id. at 131. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. 
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Committee notes on Rule 2007 from the 1991 version of the rule left the door 
open for more judicial involvement in committee creation, the court could 
disband a committee if it saw fit to do so.135 Although dicta, this portion of the 
opinion was a forceful foreshadowing of courts asserting the ability to disband 
committees. 
Conversely, In re New Life Fellowship foretold the opposite side of the 
modern split by suggesting that courts could never have the authority to disband 
a creditor committee.136 New Life Fellowship was decided in the Western 
District of Oklahoma in 1996 and concerned the issue of whether the court could 
vacate the appointment of a bondholder’s committee upon a motion from the 
unsecured creditors committee, the case trustee, and the bondholders’ trustee.137 
Rather than narrowly tailoring the opinion to the specific facts in dispute, the 
court answered the broader question of whether a court could ever disband a 
committee.138 Here, the court determined that bankruptcy judges are never 
empowered to disband a committee.139 The court supported this conclusion by 
reasoning that the text of § 1102 did not provide for the abolition of a committee 
under any circumstances.140 The court then attempted to avoid creating a circuit 
split by distinguishing the question from the contrary authority of In re Dow 
Corning Corp. and other similar cases.141 Consequently, New Life Fellowship 
not only foreshadowed the post BAPCPA debate, but also staked an early and 
strong position in the discussion. 
C. The New Circuit Split: A Judge’s Authority to Disband a Committee 
The debate over a bankruptcy judge’s authority over a committee has 
evolved since the passage of the BAPCPA in 2005. Instead of being a broad 
question of whether a judge can alter the membership of a committee, the dispute 
has narrowed to determining whether a judge can eliminate a creditor committee. 
In this dispute, there is little case law which directly addresses the question. In 
 
 135 This was due to the court’s view that the U.S. Trustee was an administrative agency within the meaning 
of the Administrative Agency Procedure Act, and thus subject to court “arbitrary and capricious” review. In re 
Dow Corning Corp., 194 B.R. at 131–32 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996).  
 136 In re New Life Fellowship, Inc., 202 B.R. 994 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1996). 
 137 Id. at 995. 
 138 Id. The case could have been decided merely on the fact that, in lieu of the bondholder’s committee, 
the bondholders had no committee representation; despite § 1102(a)(2) permitting the court to order the 
appointment of such a committee to “assure adequate representation”. It is clear that the court could have decided 
to resolve the case on that narrower basis. The court, however, did not elect to take such a narrow approach. See 
11 U.S.C. 1102(a)(2). 
 139 In re New Life Fellowship, Inc., 202 B.R. at 995. 
 140 Id. 
 141 See id. at 996; see also In re Texaco Inc., 79 B.R. 560, 562 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
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fact, the universe of cases which are directly on point is populated by only eight 
decisions: three of these cases concluding that a bankruptcy judge has the 
authority to disband a committee;142 two cases arriving at the opposite 
conclusion, holding that the Bankruptcy Code imparts no such authority to 
bankruptcy judges;143 and three other cases addressing the issue but, despite 
having taken notice of the split, declining to decide the question.144 
Consequently, there is no majority rule on the question, which has left the courts 
to engage in the unique practice of arguing canons of interpretation and trying 
to divine the policy goals of Congress. 
1. Post-BAPCPA Case Law 
Since the 2005 passage of BAPCP, the courts which hold that judges do have 
the authority to disband a committee have each adopted varied, but related, 
reasoning which is worth discussing in some detail. The first post-BAPCPA 
court to assert the court’s authority to disband a creditor committee was the 
Bankruptcy Court of the Western District of North Carolina in In re Pacific 
Avenue, LLC.145 The court in Pacific Avenue reasoned that § 105(d) of the 
Bankruptcy Code authorizes the judge to disband a creditor committee.146 
Quoting the portion of § 105(d)(2) which permits the court to issue an order so 
as to “ensure that the case is handled expeditiously and economically . . . ;” the 
court maintained that the committee in question was due to be disbanded because 
its continued existence was redundant and counterproductive.147 According to 
the court, the trustee could protect the interests of the class of creditors to the 
same extent that the committee could, rendering the committee redundant.148 
Additionally, the court believed that the actions of the creditor’s committee had 
actively harmed all parties involved in the litigation, rendering the committee 
counterproductive.149 Consequently, the court felt comfortable issuing an order 
 
 142 In re City of Detroit, Mich., 519 B.R. 673, 680 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014); In re Pac. Ave., LLC, 467 
B.R. 868, 870 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2012); In re Dow Corning Corp., 194 B.R. 121, 131 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996), 
rev’d, 212 B.R. 258 (E.D. Mich. 1997). 
 143 In re Caesars Entm’t Operating Co., Inc., 526 B.R. 265 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2015); In re New Life 
Fellowship, Inc., 202 B.R. 994, 997 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1996). 
 144 In re JNL Funding Corp., 438 B.R. 356, 361 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Dewey & Leboeuf LLP, 
No. 12-12321 MG, 2012 WL 5985325, at *5 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2012); In re Hearthstone Homes, Inc., 
No. BK12-80348-TLS, 2012 WL 4027296, at *3 (Bankr. D. Neb. Sept. 12, 2012). 
 145 In re Pac. Ave., LLC, 467 B.R. 868 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2012). 
 146 Id. at 870. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. (“Although the Committee insists that it is working to promote and protect its unique interests, the 
court is not aware of any way in which that has actually occurred.”). 
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granting the U.S. Trustee’s motion to disband the unsecured creditors 
committee.150 
The second post-BAPCPA case to affirm the courts authority to disband a 
committee was In re City of Detroit, Mich.,151 and came out of the Bankruptcy 
Court of the Eastern District of Michigan. Similar to Pacific Avenue, City of 
Detroit read § 105 to confer to the court an authority to disband a creditor 
committee.152 However, rather than looking to § 105(d), the City of Detroit court 
instead relied on § 105(a).153 The court read § 105(a) to be a grant of broad 
equitable powers to the court, insofar as the court’s exercise of discretion was 
not inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code.154 Additionally, in response to the 
U.S. Trustee’s claim that the express delegation of the power to modify 
committees in § 1102 defined the outer bounds of a judge’s authority, the City 
of Detroit court noted that the Code did not expressly prohibit a judge from 
disbanding a committee.155 Thus, because the court did not view such authority 
to be contradictory to any section of the Bankruptcy Code, the court saw the 
power to disband creditor committees to be inherent in the court’s § 105(a) 
equitable powers.156 
The reasoning of the City of Detroit is diametrically opposed to that of the 
court in In re Caesars Entm’t Operating Co., Inc.,157 a case out of the 
Bankruptcy Court of the Northern District of Illinois. The court in Caesars 
argued that judges lacked sufficient authority to disband a committee due to the 
specific language used in § 1102.158 To arrive this conclusion, the court 
employed the canon of statutory interpretation expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius to say that § 1102(a)’s express delegation of authority to alter committee 
membership must be read to exclude any unstated power to disband 
committees.159 
 
 150 Order Granting Trustee’s Motion to Disband Unsecured Creditors’ Committee, No. 10-32093 Doc. 744 
(Filed Jan. 26, 2012). See generally In re Pac. Ave., LLC, 467 B.R. 868 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2012). 
 151 In re City of Detroit, Mich., 519 B.R. 673. 
 152 In re City of Detroit, Mich., 519 B.R. at 680. This conclusion was reached after the court initially held 
that § 1102 was inapplicable to chapter 9 cases. The discussion concerning § 105 was conducted in the 
alternative, assuming that § 1102 was applicable to chapter 9 bankruptcies. 
 153 Id. 
 154 In re City of Detroit, Mich., 519 B.R. at 679–80. 
 155 Id. at 680. 
 156 Id. 
 157 In re Caesars Entm’t Operating Co., Inc., 526 B.R. 265 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2015). 
 158 Id. at 268. 
 159 Id. at 268–69. 
GENSBURGCOMMENTPROOFS_7.11.19 7/11/2019 10:13 AM 
2019] ROGUE COMMITTEES OR ROGUE JUDGES 623 
The Caesars court then addressed the § 105 reasoning adopted by Pacific 
Avenue and City of Detroit.160 According to the Caesars court, § 105 solely 
empowers courts to implement existing Bankruptcy Code provisions.161 This 
means that § 105 cannot be used to find equity where the Code does not provide 
for it and cannot be the basis creating an “independent source of rights.”162 The 
court reasoned that if Congress had intended bankruptcy judges to have the 
power to disband committees, then it would have written such an allowance 
explicitly into § 1102(a).163 The fact that Congress did not do so was an 
indication, to the Caesars court, that such a power was not given to bankruptcy 
judges.164 
It is much easier to understand the reasoning adopted in Caesars when 
viewed in the context of the court’s prior decision In re ShoreBank Corp.165 
ShoreBank concerned an emergency motion made by three unsecured creditors 
to direct the U.S. Trustee to reconstitute the unsecured creditor’s committee.166 
The court denied the creditor’s motion, holding that § 1102(a)(4) does not 
authorize the court to review any decision made by the U.S. Trustee.167 
Harkening back to the old circuit split concerning a judge’s ability to alter the 
membership of a committee, the ShoreBank court noted that when Congress 
restored a judge’s ability to alter committee membership in BAPCPA, it did not 
define “adequate representation.”168 Because of this, the court placed the heavy 
burden of proving a breach of fiduciary duty on the movants.169 
 
 160 Id. at 269. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Id. (“Had Congress wanted to give bankruptcy courts the power to abolish committees appointed under 
section 1102(a)(1), it could have done so. It chose not to. That choice must be respected.”). 
 164 Similarly, the court was not convinced by the ad hoc committee’s argument that the second official 
committee was no longer necessary to for adequate representation. The ad hoc committee was an unofficial and 
uncompensated committee constituting 12.75% of the debtor’s Second Priority Secured Noteholders with notes 
coming due in 2018. This ad hoc committee filed a brief joining the debtor’s motion to disbanding the official 
committee; arguing that the second official committee ought to be eliminated because the official committee had 
become redundant, the official committee could effectively operate in an ad hoc capacity, and because the 
intercreditor agreement obviated the need for the official committee. The Court disregarded these arguments in 
the course of rejecting the debtor’s original motion. See Joinder of the Ad Hoc Committee of First Lien Bank 
Lenders to, and Response in Support of, Debtor’s Motion for Entry of an Order Disbanding the Official 
Committee of Second Priority Noteholders, Reconstituting it With the Creditor’s Committee or, Alternatively, 
Limiting its Scope, Fees, and Expenses, No. 15-01145 Doc. 463 (Filed Feb. 25, 2015). See generally In re 
Caesars Entm’t Operating Co., Inc., 526 B.R. 265. 
 165 In re ShoreBank Corp., 467 B.R. 156 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2012). 
 166 Id. at 157. 
 167 Id. at 161. 
 168 Id. at 160. 
 169 Id. at 161. 
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ShoreBank made the unique argument that the bankruptcy court could not 
review the actions of the U.S. Trustee.170 It reasoned that § 1102(a)(4), rather 
than permitting a judge to review the decision of the Trustee, required the 
bankruptcy judge to make an independent determination of whether committee 
membership ought to be altered.171 This was rooted in the principle that court 
administrative review of an action would require the court to review the records 
of the Trustee, records that the Trustee was not statutorily required to 
generate.172 Because the Trustee was not required to produce a record there was 
nothing for the court to review, and thus no administrative court review of any 
action of the Trustee could take place.173 
Thus, ShoreBank served as the foundation for the court’s later decision in 
Caesars. The debtor in Caesars argued that the Trustee had inappropriately 
permitted the second lien holders to form an official committee.174 Despite the 
debtor’s arguments, this was a request to have the court administratively review 
a decision of the Trustee. Based on ShoreBank, it was clear that the court in 
Caesars would not engage in such a review. Caesars was a natural outgrowth of 
ShoreBank’s prior unwillingness treat the U.S. Trustee as a reviewable entity. 
Consequently, the court’s unwillingness to “look behind the curtain” to review 
the decision-making of the Trustee meant that the court was also unwilling to 
disband a committee for its misbehavior in Caesars. 
2. Courts That Dodged the Question 
While there are two diametrically opposed bodies of case law, the majority 
of the post-BAPCPA cases addressing the issue have declined to take a side. The 
earliest of the cases to acknowledge the question was In re JNL Funding 
Corp.,175 decided in 2010 by the Bankruptcy Court of the Eastern District of 
New York. This opinion preceded Pacific Avenue and was thus the first court to 
acknowledge the question. JNL Funding concerned a secured creditor who 
 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. at 162. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. (“Because the U.S. Trustee supplies neither a rationale nor a record, there is nothing for a court to 
review—other than the bare decision itself, that is—and without a rationale or a record no meaningful review 
can take place”). 
 174 Exhibit C: Notice of Debtors’ Motion for Entry of an Order Disbanding The Official Committee of 
Second Priority Noteholders, Reconstituting it With the Creditors’ Committee or, Alternatively, Limiting its 
Scope, Fees and Expenses, No. 15-01145 Doc. 384 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. February 19, 2015). See generally In re 
Caesars Entm’t Operating Co., Inc., 526 B.R. 265 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2015). 
 175 In re JNL Funding Corp., 438 B.R. 356 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2010). 
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claimed that no creditor held an allowable claim against the debtor.176 As such, 
the secured creditor filed a motion to have the creditor’s committee disbanded.177 
The court denied the motion on the basis that the Trustee had acted reasonably 
in appointing the committee.178 In reaching this decision, the court addressed the 
question of committee disbandment by merely stating, “[n]otably, however, 
Section 1102 is silent as to this Court having power to order a committee to be 
disbanded, rather than reconstituted to ensure adequate representation.”179 That 
sentence was the extent of the court’s discussion of judicial disbandment of a 
committee. 
Nonetheless, JNL Funding discussed at length the vitally important question 
of the appropriate standard of review of the U.S. Trustee. On this point, the court 
maintained that the U.S. Trustee ought to be subject only to an arbitrary and 
capricious standard of court review.180 The court reasoned that Congress had 
delegated the administrative tasks of bankruptcy to the U.S. Trustee with the 
passage of the Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer 
Bankruptcy Act of 1986.181 Because of this express delegation, the court held 
that Congress had intentionally limited the court’s role in committee 
formation.182 As such, a de novo review of U.S. Trustee committee formation 
would be inconsistent with its congressionally delegated administrative 
responsibilities.183 The U.S. Trustee’s decision with respect to § 1102 committee 
appointment could only be set aside if it was demonstrated that the U.S. Trustee 
relied on impermissible facts to arrive at that decision.184 
The next case to consider the question of committee disbandment, but avoid 
the issue, was In re Hearthstone Homes, Inc., which concerned objections to the 
unsecured creditor committee’s application for fees.185 According to the 
objecting parties, the appointment of a chapter 11 trustee negated the need for 
the committee and the committee’s continued existence needlessly created a 
financial impediment to confirmation.186 Here, the chapter 11 trustee had made 
 
 176 Id. at 359 (“TFC asserts that no Committee Member holds an allowable claim against Debtor, but, 
instead, may hold a claim only in the [CEO’s] Individual Case.”). 
 177 Id. at 359–60. 
 178 Id. at 360. 
 179 Id. at 361. 
 180 In re JNL Funding Corp., 438 B.R. at 360. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. at 361. 
 183 Id. at 362. 
 184 Id. at 363. 
 185 In re Hearthstone Homes, Inc., No. BK12-80348-TLS, 2012 WL 4027296, at *1 (Bankr. D. Neb. Sept. 
12, 2012). 
 186 Id. at *3. 
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a clear effort to have the unsecured creditor committee disbanded.187 Despite 
this, the court dodged the issue by merely reducing the committee’s approved 
fees from $85,681.50 to $53,048.00.188 
Nonetheless, Hearthstone Homes meaningfully discussed the court’s roll in 
monitoring committees. It held that bankruptcy courts cannot approve 
committee fees if such fees are the result of duplicative work or 
disproportionately reduce the chance of the reorganization succeeding.189 As a 
result, the Hearthstone Homes decision implied that courts must play an active 
role in protecting the estate and the debtor-in-possession from committee 
misbehavior. 
Two months after Hearthstone Homes, In re Dewey & Leboeuf LLP was 
decided in the Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District of New York.190 The 
central issue in Dewey was whether the court could disband the Official 
Committee of Former Partners.191 The debtor and unsecured creditor committee 
moved for disbanding the former partner committee on the belief that the 
committee of former partners was counterproductive, too expensive, and no 
longer necessary for adequate representation.192 The moving parties argued that 
disbandment was an implicit court power that necessarily accompanied its 
power to order the appointment of new committees.193 The court dodged this 
question by deciding that the committee still served an important purpose.194 It 
was clear that the Dewey court was aware of the open question of court authority 
to disband, but felt as though it did not need to take a side in the split. 
 
 187 Id. at *11. 
 188 Id. at *10. 
 189 Id. at *5–7; see also In re Agriprocessors, Inc., No. 08-02751, 2009 WL 2578950, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. 
Iowa Aug. 19, 2009). 
 190 In re Dewey & Leboeuf LLP, No. 12-12321 MG, 2012 WL 5985325 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2012). 
 191 Id. at *1. 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. at *2. 
 194 “Under the circumstances here the Court need not reach the issue whether section 1102 implicitly 
confers on the Court the authority to order an official committee appointed by the UST to be disbanded based 
on subsequent changed circumstances, or whether sections 105 and 1102 when applied together provide such 
authority, because even if the Court has such authority, the Court concludes that the FPC [Former Partner’s 
Committee] continues to serve an important purpose, the most obvious function being to prosecute the appeal 
the FPC filed from this Court’s decision denying the examiner motion and approving the PCP.” Memorandum 
Opinion and Order Denying Debtor’s Application for an Order Directing the United States Trustee to Disband 
the Offical Committee of Former Partners, 1:12-bk-12321, In re Dewey & Leboeuf LLP, No. 12-12321 MG, 
2012 WL 5985325, at *5 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2012) (Doc. 674). 
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Yet, Dewey analogized committee disbandment with § 1102(a)(2)’s 
empowerment of the court to appoint an additional committee.195 It went on to 
say that if the court did have the authority to disband a committee, such a power 
could only derive from a showing that the committee in question no longer 
adequately represented its constituency.196 Despite the court’s unwillingness to 
make such a finding, Dewey warned the former partners committee against 
driving the case into administrative insolvency through its fee applications.197 
Accordingly, Dewey was aware of the circuit split and proposed a framework 
for determining if a committee ought to be disbanded, but did not go so far as to 
expressly take a side.198 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The debate over a judge’s authority to disband a committee has not yielded 
a consistent answer as to the legal question, nor has it provided any sort of 
guidance to courts moving forward. This Section contains this Comment’s six-
part analysis of the debate over committee disbandment. First, this Section 
describes why bankruptcy courts have confused the debate over committee 
disbandment. Second, the real-world effects of committees magnifying 
administrative claims are articulated. Third, this Section argues that judge’s 
must have the “judicial hammer” of committee disbandment. Fourth, analogous 
areas of court authority are presented. Fifth, the procedural question of how 
disbandment ought to occur is addressed. Sixth, this Section proposes a three-
step factor test to guide courts in determining if they ought to disband a 
committee. 
A. Bankruptcy Courts Have Confused the Debate 
While the modern split is an outgrowth of the pre-BAPCPA split, unlike the 
prior split, the current circuit dispute appears to conflate two separate questions 
of law. These two questions are whether a bankruptcy judge may second guess 
the U.S. Trustee in its decision to create the committee and whether a bankruptcy 
judge may remedy the misfeasance or malfeasance of an already existent 
committee. As it currently stands, all reported cases on the authority of a 
bankruptcy judge to disband a committee mistakenly conflate these two 
 
 195 Id. at *3. 
 196 Id. at *5. 
 197 Id. 
 198 Despite this unwillingness to take a side. It seems clear from the language used in the opinion that the 
Dewey court thought that it could disband a committee if the need to truly arose. See generally In re Dewey & 
Leboeuf LLP, No. 12-12321 MG, 2012 WL 5985325 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2012). 
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questions and, as a result, these courts have arrived at incomplete legal 
conclusions. When viewed in context, Caesars was correct to answer in the 
negative to the former inquiry, yet, at the same time, Pacific Avenue and City of 
Detroit were correct to answer in the affirmative to the latter. 
It is clear that a bankruptcy judge may not substitute his or her own 
judgement for that of the Trustee. Courts have routinely held that the judge 
should not second guess the discretionary decisions of the Trustee.199 It has been 
suggested that this is due to the belief that judicial second guessing would harm 
the administration of bankruptcy proceedings by causing the U.S. Trustee to act 
in an overly conservative manner.200 As such, courts have generally held that 
they will only review the U.S. Trustee’s decisions pertaining to committee 
membership on a de novo basis, so as to ensure that the decisions are facially 
reasonable. 201 
Here, both ShoreBank and Caesars were correct. In ShoreBank, the court 
accurately stated that the bankruptcy judge was not entitled to administratively 
review the discretionary decisions of the U.S. Trustee.202 To this limited extent, 
Caesars appropriately held that § 105(a) did not create a substantive authority 
for the court to second guess the U.S. Trustee.203 Similarly, it appropriately held 
that § 1102(a) did not license the court to substitute its judgment for the U.S. 
Trustee’s with respect to deciding which creditors should serve on the 
committee.204 
Nonetheless, it is equally clear that the bankruptcy court may employ its 
equitable powers to resolve inequities caused by litigating parties.205 
Particularly, bankruptcy courts have the authority to police the conduct of 
creditors to ensure that the actions of some creditors do not harm the financial 
interests of others.206 This is because “[f]ederal courts have inherent equitable 
power to sanction a litigant’s malfeasance.”207 In bankruptcy, the source of this 
 
 199 Seafarers Pension Plan v. Sturgis, 630 F.2d 218, 221 (4th Cir. 1980) (“We may not second guess the 
Trustees’ discretionary judgments.”). 
 200 In re Melenyzer, 140 B.R. 143, 155 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1992). 
 201 See In re Value Merchants, Inc., 202 B.R. 280, 287 (E.D. Wis. 1996). 
 202 See In re ShoreBank Corp., 467 B.R. 156, 162 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2012). 
 203 In re Caesars Entm’t Operating Co., Inc., 526 B.R. 265, 269 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2015). 
 204 Id. 
 205 See Matter of W. T. Grant Co., 4 B.R. 53, 74 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980) (“A fundamental characteristic 
of the bankruptcy court is its expansive equitable powers”). 
 206 See In re Kansas City Journal-Post Co., 144 F.2d 791, 800 (8th Cir. 1944) (citing Prudence Realization 
Corp. v. Geist, 316 U.S. 89, 94, 62 S. Ct. 978, 982, 86 L. Ed. 1293 (1942)) (“[S]ubordination is usually said to 
be aimed at leveling off, as practicably as possible, the effects of ‘the inequitable conduct of a claimant . . . .’”). 
 207 In re Phillips Grp., Inc., 382 B.R. 876, 888 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2008). 
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inherent equitable power is § 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.208 While the 
courts’ § 105(a) equitable powers are broad, they are limited to effectuating 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.209 
In this equally narrow respect, both Pacific Avenue and City of Detroit were 
decided correctly. Pacific Avenue appropriately employed its equitable powers 
to disband a committee which it saw to be counterproductive and thus engaged 
in the misfeasance of harming secured creditors by unnecessarily reducing the 
cash collateral available to the secured creditor.210 Similarly, City of Detroit 
correctly determined that it was empowered to disband a committee which had 
committed the misfeasance of refusing to participate in, and actually disavowed, 
the mediation process.211 In both of these cases, the courts did not look behind 
the reasoning of the U.S. Trustee in appointing the committee, but instead 
disbanded the committee as an equitable remedy to the inequity caused by the 
misfeasance of that committee. 
Nonetheless, in as much as Caesars, Pacific Avenue, and City of Detroit 
were decided correctly, each of these opinions also over-applied their reasoning 
and arrived at partially incorrect conclusions. Caesars overextended the entirely 
accurate prohibition against second guessing the discretion of the U.S. Trustee 
to incorrectly claim that the court could never disband a committee.212 Similarly, 
Pacific Avenue and City of Detroit overextended their correct inclinations to 
remedy inequity in the bankruptcy proceedings by inappropriately “looking 
behind the curtain” of the U.S. Trustee’s reasoning for preserving or appointing 
the committee in the first place.213 As such, by failing to narrowly frame the 
question, all courts may have produced incomplete and partially incorrect 
conclusions of law. 
 
 208 In re Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc., 351 F.3d 86, 91 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 209 In re Middleton Arms, Ltd. P’ship, 934 F.2d 723, 724 (6th Cir. 1991). 
 210 See Order Granting Trustee’s Motion to Disband Unsecured Creditors’ Committee, No. 10-32093 Doc. 
744 at 4 (Filed Jan. 26, 2012). 
 211 See In re City of Detroit, Mich., 519 B.R. 673, 680 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014). 
 212 In re Caesars Entm’t Operating Co., Inc., 526 B.R. at 269. When the court held that “Section 105(a) 
thus is not a vehicle for reading into section 1102(a)(1) a power to do away with statutory committees when 
section 1102(a)(1) itself grants no such power . . . .”, it read the equitable powers of § 105 out of the Bankruptcy 
Code. Section 105 may not be a vehicle to read a power into § 1102, but that does not mean it is not a vehicle to 
administer equitable remedies when such remedies are necessary to achieve the purposes of the Bankruptcy 
Code. 
 213 See In re Pac. Ave., LLC, 467 B.R. 868, 870 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2012) (“The Trustee is capable of and 
required to adequately represent the interests of unsecured creditors in these cases. Consequently, the 
Committee’s representation is duplicative and unnecessary.”); In re City of Detroit, Mich., 519 B.R. 673, 681 
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014) (“[T]he Court remains wholly unconvinced that the Committee would play the useful 
or valuable role contemplated by § 1102.”). 
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B. The Real Effects of Committee Magnification of Administrative Claims 
While the issue of committee disbandment has only arisen in the courts eight 
times, the real-world harm of committees unduly forcing conversion to chapter 
7 occurs on a more commonplace basis. “[E]ach administrative or priority 
creditor may hold the future of the case in its hands. ‘In bankruptcy, everyone’s 
fate—the debtors, its employees and its creditors—is often intertwined and 
dependent on the success of the plan.’”214 Despite the fact that the legalistic 
question of court authority is rarely brought to the court’s attention, committees 
can force conversion where such conversion might have otherwise been 
unnecessary and might be attributable to committee abuses. 
The inability of courts to disband committees can force judges to adopt the 
role of fortuneteller. In In re SunEdison, Inc., the court was required to consider 
potential committee professional expenses before a committee had been 
formed.215 In this frontloaded analysis, the court had to determine whether or not 
equity holders in an insolvent company could form an official committee.216 The 
court held that the a committee could not be formed because, “[t]he fees and 
expenses incurred by the Equity Committee’s professionals, if allowed by the 
Court, . . . are administrative claims . . . [and] [p]ayments to [committee] 
professionals generally reduce the amount available for distribution.”217 Without 
the power to disband the committee at a later date, the SunEdison court and 
others are often forced to engage in this type forward thinking analysis. 
When a court fails to act as a fortuneteller, committees have room to create 
significant inequities. An illustrative case of is In re BH S & B Holdings, LLC.218 
At the onset of the bankruptcy, the debtor had $2,704,976 of unrestricted cash 
on hand to administer the chapter 11 case.219 However, despite this sizeable cash 
reserve, the creditor committee incurred professional fees totaling $2,188,902, 
an amount that forced the debtor’s case into administrative insolvency.220 By the 
court’s own admission, these committee expenses were excessive in view of the 
fact that “the Committee’s efforts have yielded relatively small returns at very 
 
 214 In re Molycorp, Inc., 562 B.R. 67, 78 (Bankr. D. Del. 2017) (quoting Douglas G. Baird, Elements of 
Bankruptcy 240–41 (6th ed. 2014)). 
 215 See In re SunEdison, Inc., 556 B.R. 94, 102 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
 216 See id. 
 217 Id. 
 218 See In re BH S & B Holdings, LLC, 439 B.R. 342, 2010 BL 273757 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 219 Id. 
 220 Id. 
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substantial expense”221 and that the quality of committee representation “raises 
serious questions”222 about the litigation tactics adopted by the committee. 
What is more, the debtor in BH S & B attempted to mitigate the damage of 
the committee’s excessive fee applications by filing a turnover motion to have 
much of the money inappropriately paid out to the committee reclaimed by the 
debtor.223 The debtor sought an order declaring that the committee was not 
entitled to $1,130,000 in compensation for fees and expenses, disgorging 
$379,033 in committee attorney’s fees, and declaring that the committee’s 
financial advisors were not entitled to $272,092 in fees.224 Moreover, this motion 
was accompanied by an affidavit attesting to the debtor’s potential 
administrative solvency if the funds paid to the committee were not returned.225 
However, given the nature of the motion, the fact that there were other issues 
with the bankruptcy,226 and the expense of litigating the calculation of 
appropriate fees in view of prior debtor-creditor fee stipulations, the court 
determined that the turnover motion was most appropriately decided post-
conversion.227 Consequently, despite the debtor’s best efforts, the BH S & B 
bankruptcy was forced to convert to chapter 7, and the committee’s incurrence 
of objectionable professional fees was a reason for said conversion. 
C. The Need For a Judicial Hammer 
Justice requires that courts of equity use the lightest touch possible to resolve 
inequities;228 however, sometimes the lightest appropriate touch is the full force 
of the judicial “hammer.” In the context of committee misbehavior, this 
“hammer” is the judicial disbandment of the rogue committee. Because the court 
has the clear statutory authority to remove the debtor-in-possession from 
governing his or her estate, it is eminently reasonable to assert that a parallel 
 
 221 Id. 
 222 Id. 
 223 Debtors’ Emergency Motion For Turnover of Funds Improperly Paid to Committee Professionals and 
Related Relief, 1:08-bk-14604, In re BH S & B Holdings, LLC, 439 B.R. 342, 2010 BL 273757 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2010) (Doc. 869). 
 224 In re BH S & B Holdings, LLC, 439 B.R. at 350. 
 225 Declaration of Robert Tetreault in Support of Debtors’ Emergency Motion For Turnover of Funds 
Improperly Paid to Committee Professionals and Related Relief, 1:08-bk-14604, In re BH S & B Holdings, LLC, 
439 B.R. 342, 2010 BL 273757 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2010) (Doc. 870). 
 226 BH S & B’s bankruptcy was plagued by numerous issues which all contributed to the case’s conversion 
to chapter 7. One such issue was the debtor’s failure to propose a plan. See generally In re BH S & B Holdings, 
LLC, 439 B.R. 342. 
 227 439 B.R. at 350-51. 
 228 Devitt v. Potter, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1039 (D.N.D. 2002), aff’d sub nom. Carriere v. Potter, 83 F. 
App’x 139 (8th Cir. 2003) (“A court must grant equitable relief sparingly.”). 
GENSBURGCOMMENTPROOFS_7.11.19 7/11/2019 10:13 AM 
632 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 35 
power exists with respect to creditor committees. Such a “hammer” is a 
necessary item in the bankruptcy judge’s toolbox so that the court can fully 
police the misconduct of the litigating parties. 
For the debtor-in-possession, the “hammer” is the judicial appointment of a 
trustee to manage the chapter 11 debtor’s estate.229 Under § 1104(a), the court 
may remove a debtor from possession and appoint a chapter 11 trustee if the 
court finds that the debtor was engaged in fraud, grossly mismanaged the estate, 
or needed to be removed from possession to preserve the interests of creditors.230 
In fact, it has been established that the court can appoint a chapter 11 trustee sua 
sponte as a product of the court’s § 105 equitable powers.231 
A parallel “hammer” must exist to correct the misfeasance or malfeasance 
of a committee. This need is bolstered by the fact that the U.S. Trustee is 
mandated to remove committee members who may even appear to have 
breached their fiduciary duty: 
A creditor on a committee who exudes the appearance of a breach of 
fiduciary duty undermines that basic bankruptcy tenet, thereby 
corrupting the process. The United States Trustee would act arbitrarily 
and capriciously if he refused to remove a committee member who 
held a conflict of interest amounting to a breach of the fiduciary duty 
owed by the creditor to the creditors represented by the committee or 
who appeared to hold such a conflict.232 
If allowing a creditor who appears to have breached his or her fiduciary duty to 
remain on a committee is enough to corrupt the bankruptcy process, then 
certainly a committee that has breached its fiduciary duty would similarly 
corrupt the bankruptcy process. In such an instance of committee misfeasance 
or malfeasance, it would be arbitrary and capricious for the U.S. Trustee to not 
disband the committee.233 Yet, without the hammer of judicial disbandment, 
such an arbitrary and capricious derogation of the bankruptcy process could 
flourish. 
 
 229 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (a). 
 230 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)–(2). 
 231 In re U.S. Mineral Prod. Co., 105 F. App’x 428, 431 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 232 In re Venturelink Holdings, Inc., 299 B.R. 420, 423 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003). 
 233 Id. 
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D. The “Hammer” of the Court’s Section 105(a) Equitable Powers 
Prior to the creation of a committee, membership issues can be resolved by 
the U.S. Trustee declining to form the committee.234 Post formation, bankruptcy 
judges can only exercise the authority granted to them by the Code to police 
litigating parties. Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a court 
may issue all necessary orders to carry out the provisions of title 11: 
The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary 
or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. No provision of 
this title providing for the raising of an issue by a party in interest shall 
be construed to preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any action 
or making any determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or 
implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of process.235 
The equitable powers § 105(a) gives the court are, as a result, broad and leave 
much to the discretion of the bankruptcy judge. 
While the Supreme Court has held that § 105(a) does “not [authorize the 
judge] in the name of equity to make wholesale substitution of underlying law,” 
it does permit the judge to find equity where the Bankruptcy Code itself already 
provides.236 Because the Bankruptcy Code already provides for the adequate 
representation of creditors vis-à-vis the formation of committees, courts 
logically have § 105(a) equitable powers to preserve the quality of that 
representation.237 Since the U.S. Trustee was not expressly granted authority to 
disband creditor committees, it is imperative that the court fill this void.238 
 The Supreme Court has established that every federal court has the inherent 
power to sanction or otherwise control abusive litigation practices.239 In a 
bankruptcy case, this inherent power is expressed by § 105 of the Bankruptcy 
Code. More specifically, § 105(a) empowers the bankruptcy judge to take any 
action deemed necessary to prevent abuses of the bankruptcy process, stating 
“[o]n the contrary, the broad authority granted to bankruptcy judges to take 
any action that is necessary or appropriate ‘to prevent an abuse of process’ 
described in § 105(a) of the Code . . . .”240Due to this, § 105 has been broadly 
 
 234 SALLY S. NEELY, Official Committees in Chapter 11, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: CHAPTER 11 
BUSINESS REORGANIZATION 33, 55–56 (2001). 
 235 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (emphasis added). 
 236 Raleigh v. Illinois Dep’t of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 24–25 (2000). 
 237 See generally In re City of Detroit, Mich., 519 B.R. 673, 680 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014). 
 238 In re Dow Corning Corp., 194 B.R. 121, 131 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996), rev’d, 212 B.R. 258 (E.D. 
Mich. 1997). 
 239 Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 376 (2007). 
 240 Id. at 375 (emphasis added). 
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understood to be the bankruptcy court’s primary source of statutory authority to 
preserve the proper administration of the debtor’s case.241 
Additionally, there are similar situations where the bankruptcy courts’ § 105 
powers are broadly agreed to extend to police the conduct of parties. It is well 
established that § 105 permits the court to force the debtor to turn over all of his 
or her property to the trustee.242 Nowhere does the Bankruptcy Code give the 
court the power to issue such a turnover order; however, the inherent powers of 
the court and § 105 have been widely accepted as the legitimate source of such 
authority.243 Section 105 has similarly been accepted as the source of the courts’ 
authority to issue various procedural orders enforcing the stay.244 Consequently, 
the inherent power of the court and § 105 powers are not confined to a narrow 
set of circumstances. Such bankruptcy court powers often permeate other related 
areas of the common law surrounding court authority and give judges powers 
not otherwise expressly delegated in the Bankruptcy Code. 
E. Analogous Rule 2007 Exercises of Court Authority 
Despite the novelty of the question of committee disbandment, Rule 2007 of 
the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure exists as an instructive analogy. 
When added to the legal landscape and context of the debate, Rule 2007 makes 
clear that the court must have the authority to disband a committee. 
Rule 2007 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, entitled “Review 
of Appointment of Creditors’ Committee Organized Before Commencement of 
the Case,” permits the court to vacate the appointment of a committee in very 
limited circumstances.245 In pertinent part, Rule 2007 states: 
(a) Motion to review appointment 
If a committee appointed by the United States trustee pursuant to 
§ 1102(a) of the Code consists of the members of a committee 
organized by creditors before the commencement of a chapter 9 or 
chapter 11 case, on motion of a party in interest and after a hearing on 
notice to the United States trustee and other entities as the court may 
direct, the court may determine whether the appointment of the 
committee satisfies the requirements of § 1102(b)(1) of the Code. 
 
 241 Law v. Siegel, Brief for Bankruptcy Law Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 2013 WL 
4769424 (U.S.), 23 (2013). 
 242 Id. at 21; see also 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(4). 
 243 Law v. Siegel, Brief for Bankruptcy Law Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 2013 WL 
4769424 (U.S.), 22 (2013). 
 244 Id. at 24. 
 245 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 2007. 
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. . . 
(c) Failure to comply with requirements for appointment 
After a hearing on notice pursuant to subdivision (a) of this rule, the 
court shall direct the United States trustee to vacate the appointment 
of the committee and may order other appropriate action if the court 
finds that such appointment failed to satisfy the requirements of 
§ 1102(b)(1) of the Code.246 
By its text, Rule 2007 only applies to situations in which the U.S. Trustee has 
given official standing to a pre-existing ad hoc committee, without regard to 
§ 1102(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code.247 The case law surrounding Rule 2007 is 
thin; however, its use demonstrates a broader power of the court than what Rule 
2007 narrowly prescribes.248 
At the most basic level, Rule 2007 empowers the bankruptcy court to review 
the delegation of official status to an ad hoc committee so as to ensure that 
committee membership was fairly decided.249 To decide if it was reasonable for 
the U.S. Trustee to give the ad hoc committee official status, Rule 2020 comes 
into play, and the court may then review the decision of the U.S. Trustee in 
forming the committee as a contested matter.250 This matter is decided in the 
narrow context of the ad hoc committee’s ability to satisfy Bankruptcy Code 
§ 1102(b)(1).251 If it is determined that the committee was improperly given 
official status, the court may then alter the committee’s membership to remediate 
the inequity.252 
Despite the narrow intention and actual application of Rule 2007, a handful 
of courts have read the delegation of power in Rule 2007 to signal the broad 
nature of court review.253 Significantly, this broad interpretation finds support in 
the Advisory Committee notes to Rule 2020.254 Those advisory notes state, 
 
 246 FED. R. BANKR. P. 2007(a), (c). 
 247 See In re Bayou Grp., LLC, 431 B.R. 549, 555 n.4 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010); see also In re A.H. Robins 
Co., 65 B.R. 160, 165 (E.D. Va. 1986), aff’d sub nom. Van Arsdale v. Clemo, 825 F.2d 794 (4th Cir. 1987). 
 248 A quick search of Westlaw citations to Rule 2007 reveal only fourteen cases. Furthermore, only six of 
these fourteen cases actually refer to Rule 2007 (rather than Rule 2007.1 or Rule 2007.2) and deal with the 
appointment of a committee. 
 249 In re A.H. Robins Co., 65 B.R. 160, 165 (E.D. Va. 1986), aff’d sub nom. Van Arsdale v. Clemo, 825 
F.2d 794 (4th Cir. 1987). 
 250 In re Victory Markets, Inc., 196 B.R. 1, 5 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1995); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 2020, 
9014. 
 251 In re Bayou Grp., LLC, 431 B.R. at 555 n.4. 
 252 In re Dow Corning Corp., 194 B.R. 121, 132 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996), rev’d, 212 B.R. 258 (E.D. 
Mich. 1997). 
 253 See generally In re Pierce, 237 B.R. 748, 753 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1999); In re Dow Corning Corp., 194 
B.R. at 131; In re Victory Markets, Inc., 196 B.R. at 5. 
 254 194 B.R. at 131. 
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“[a]lthough this rule deals only with judicial review of the appointment of 
prepetition committees, it does not preclude judicial review under Rule 2020 
regarding the appointment of other committees.”255 From this language it can be 
easily extrapolated that the bankruptcy court has the authority to act with respect 
to committees when the U.S. Trustee is either unwilling or unable to do so.256 
Additionally, Rule 2007 demonstrates that the U.S. Trustee does not have 
unfettered discretion with respect to committees and that committees are not 
immune from judicial supervision.257 Logically, if the court is to review 
committee action, the source of this supervisory power must come from § 105 
of the Bankruptcy Code.258 This is because § 105 conveys equitable powers to 
the bankruptcy judge, and Rule 2007 is only applicable if there is an issue of 
inequity or unfairness.259 Such logic is easily analogous to that of disbanding 
rogue committees, whose continued existence may generate inequity within the 
case’s proceedings. 
Importantly, however, this analogous nature of Rule 2007 did not escape the 
court’s attention in Caesar’s.260 In Footnote 2, the court accurately noted the 
narrow applicability of Rule 2007 and observed that no such ad-hoc-turned-
official committee existed in that case.261 In so observing, the court was correct. 
Rule 2007 certainly does not prescribe a general power to disband committees 
to judges, and it does not allow judges to second guess or look behind the 
reasoning of the U.S. Trustee.262 However, this does not defeat the logic of Rule 
2007, nor does it lessen the broad and permissive language used in Rule 2007’s 
Advisory Committee Notes. Furthermore, Rule 2007 does expressly authorize 
the court to “vacate the appointment of the committee.”263 The word “vacate” 
means “to nullify,” to “invalidate,” or, in other words, to “disband.”264 Yet, the 
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure cannot override the substantive 
 
 255 Id. at 132 (quoting Advisory Committee Note to Rule 2007 (1991)). 
 256 In re Pierce, 237 B.R. at 753. 
 257 Id. 
 258 Id. 
 259 Id. at 754. 
 260 In re Caesars Entm’t Operating Co., Inc., 526 B.R. 265, 268 n.2 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2015). 
 261 Id. 
 262 It is important to note what the court is doing when it is reviewing a Rule 2007 motion. When the court 
is reviewing a Rule 2007 motion it is deciding if the moving party has made a sufficient showing to demonstrate 
unfairness and U.S. Trustee indifference. It is emphatically not an administrative review of the non-existent 
record of the U.S. Trustee’s decision-making process in forming the committee. Similar types of judicial reviews 
are conducted to determine the trustee’s bad faith, or lack thereof, and do not constitute peaking behind the 
curtain. See c.f. In re Dow Corning Corp., 194 B.R. at 132. 
 263 FED. R. BANKR. P. 2007(c). 
 264 Vacate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, and any conflict between the Code and the 
Rules must be settled in favor of the Code.265 As such, if the Bankruptcy Code 
completely precluded disbandment of a committee, then Rule 2007 could not 
allow the vacation of its appointment. Consequentially, committee disbandment 
is, on its face, consistent with the Bankruptcy Code. 
F. The Procedural Question 
Nonetheless, even with the knowledge that the Bankruptcy Court must have 
the authority to disband a committee, there is the accompanying procedural 
question of how such a disbandment ought to occur. Within the cases in which 
courts have disbanded creditor committees, there is some inconsistency as to 
how the judge decided to procedurally do so. Some courts did so by directing 
the Trustee to dissolve the committee.266 Other courts circumvented the Trustee 
and disbanded the committee via the court’s order.267 The most reasonable and 
proper procedure is for the bankruptcy court to direct the U.S. Trustee to dissolve 
the committee. 
The procedural question may be answered by looking to analogous court 
orders pertaining to § 1102(a)(4). Section 1102(a)(4) mandates that the court 
order the U.S. Trustee to alter the membership of a committee when such change 
is necessary for the adequate representation of creditors: 
On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the 
court may order the United States trustee to change the membership of 
a committee appointed under this subsection, if the court determines 
that the change is necessary to ensure adequate representation of 
creditors or equity security holders.268 
When a court alters the membership of a committee, the appropriate means of 
doing so is via an order to the Trustee. Because of this, it follows that the 
disbandment of a committee ought to occur via an order directing the Trustee to 
eliminate the committee. 
 
 265 In re Barnes, 308 B.R. 77, 81 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2004). 
 266 Order Directing United States Trustee to Disband Official Committee of Equity Security Holders, No. 
05-44481 (RDD) Doc. 16576 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. April 23, 2009). 
 267 Order Granting Trustee’s Motion to Disband Unsecured Creditors’ Committee, No. 10-32093 Doc. 744 
(Filed Jan. 26, 2012) (“The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors is hereby disbanded and shall have no 
further standing in connection with these cases, effective upon the entry of this order.”). 
 268 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(4). 
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G. The New Factor Test 
If a bankruptcy court receives a motion to disband a creditor committee, it 
should employ a three-factor analysis to determine if disbandment is justified. 
“Abuse of Discretion” standards are undesirable because they offer no actual 
guidance to the lower courts who seek precedential authority to guide their 
decision-making.269 Instead, factor tests give lower courts guidance and promote 
horizontal uniformity among the circuits, thus creating an air of predictability 
and reducing forum shopping.270 When a court receives a motion to disband a 
committee, the court should conduct three inquiries: (1) did the committee 
engage in malfeasance or misfeasance, (2) would a “lighter touch” fix the 
problem, and (3) is the committee necessary for adequate representation. 
1. Did the Committee Engage in Malfeasance or Misfeasance? 
First, the court should determine whether the committee has acted in a way 
that unjustifiably harms the debtor-in-possession or co-creditor’s interests. This 
may be determined by measuring the average monthly professional fees 
requested by the committee, by determining if the committee is acting in a purely 
self-interested manner, or by determining if the committee has acted in bad faith. 
If the court determines that such misfeasance or malfeasance has occurred, then 
the court should use its § 105 equitable powers to remediate the inequity. 
This first step is similar to what courts already do in considering whether to 
appoint a chapter 11 trustee. When considering whether the court ought to 
remove the debtor-in-possession, the court determines whether the appointment 
of a chapter 11 trustee is in “the interests of creditors, any equity security 
holders, and other interests of the estate.”271 In practice, this analysis means that 
the court must look to see if the debtor-in-possession has engaged in any type of 
misfeasance or malfeasance.272 In the case of the appointment of a chapter 11 
trustee, the court assumes that removal is “the exception, rather than the rule.”273 
Similarly, determining if the committee has engaged in any significant 
misfeasance or malfeasance will allow disbandment to remain an exceptional 
remedy. 
 
 269 Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 
635, 659 (1971). 
 270 Shannon M. Raley, Tweaking Tinker: Redefining an Outdated Standard for the Internet Era, 59 CLEV. 
ST. L. REV. 773, 798 (2011) (“Factor tests ensure that courts . . . are not left to decipher the meaning of 
ambiguous words on their own and thus reach contradictory conclusions.”). 
 271 In re Eurospark Indus., Inc., 424 B.R. 621, 627 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting 11 U.S.C. 1104(a)(2)). 
 272 See generally In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 113 B.R. 164, 169 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
 273 In re Sharon Steel Corp., 871 F.2d 1217, 1225 (3d Cir. 1989). 
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Properly evaluating the harm caused to co-creditors was also paramount in 
the old circuit split concerning a judge’s authority to remove an individual 
committee member from the committee.274 In this analysis, courts were forced 
to determine whether a creditor had acted in such a way as to have violated their 
fiduciary duty to their co-creditors.275 Courts determine whether there was a 
conflict of interest and other misbehavior which could potentially jeopardize the 
creditor’s ability to effectively serve on the committee.276 Removal of a creditor 
was the exception and acted as a vanguard against judicial overreach. 
Consequently, a similar first step—identifying unjustified committee-caused 
harm to the debtor-in-possession or co-creditors—will make sure that committee 
disbandment remains an extreme remedy. 
2. Does a Lighter Touch Work? 
Second, the court must decide if a remedy exists which allows the court to 
preserve the committee while resolving the inequity. If denying the requested 
fees of the committee’s professionals or reconstituting the committee with other 
creditors is sufficient, then the judge should stop his or her analysis and go with 
the lighter touch. If it does not, then the court has the § 105 equitable power to 
disband the committee. 
Such a cautious approach to courts employing the remedy of judicial 
committee disbandment is mirrored in other areas of the law. One example is the 
use of judicial estoppel in bankruptcy cases. Here courts have held that “judicial 
estoppel is a powerful weapon to employ against a party seeking to vindicate its 
rights, and there are often lesser weapons that can keep alleged inconsistent 
statements in check . . . .”277 Because often a lighter touch will suffice, courts 
are to exhaust lesser remedies—such as allowing a party to impeach the debtor 
in court—before they resort to judicial estoppel.278 Similarly, courts often look 
to lesser remedies when considering whether to remove the debtor-in-possession 
from a bankruptcy with the appointment of a chapter 11 trustee.279 
 
 274 In re First RepublicBank Corp., 95 B.R. 58, 61 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988). 
 275 Id. 
 276 Id. 
 277 Vehicle Mkt. Research, Inc. v. Mitchell Int’l, Inc., 767 F.3d 987, 993 (10th Cir. 2014). 
 278 Id. 
 279 See In re Esco Elevators, Inc., No. 494-44339-MT-11, 1995 WL 605982, at *5 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Jan. 
31, 1995) (“The Court has considered whether lesser remedies would suffice, and in the context of this Case 
they would not.”). 
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Similarly, Rule 41(b)280 dismissals with prejudice require the court to 
determine that “(1) a party [has] engage[d] in a clear pattern of delay or willful 
contempt (contumacious conduct); and (2) the district court specifically finds 
that lesser sanctions would not suffice.”281 This exhaustion of lesser remedies is 
built into the trial court’s analysis for every Rule 41(b) dismissal, and the failure 
to consider lesser remedies has even been held to be an abuse of the trial judge’s 
discretion.282 
For all of these remedies—including committee disbandment—it is difficult, 
if not impossible, to “unscramble the egg” and undo court action. Because of 
this, it is necessary to bake-in a requirement that the bankruptcy judge has 
considered all lighter touches prior to disbandment. Moreover, such a 
requirement forces the bankruptcy court to fire “warning shot” lesser remedies, 
and restrains the court’s discretion in disbanding a committee. As such, due to 
the serious nature of committee disbandment, bankruptcy courts must be careful 
to exhaust lesser remedies before deciding to disband a committee. 
3. Is That Committee Necessary for Adequate Representation? 
Finally, the court needs to determine if the committee is necessary for the 
adequate representation of the class of creditors. If the court determines that the 
committee is not adequately representing the class of creditors, or if an ad hoc 
committee would provide functionally equivalent services to what the official 
committee rendered, then the committee may be redundant. This step of the 
analysis is vitally important, because the court’s § 105 equitable powers cannot 
be used to contradict express provision in the Bankruptcy Code. Because § 1102 
provides for the “adequate representation” of creditors via the creation of a 
committee, if a committee is necessary to “adequately represent” a class of 
creditors then the judge may not ever disband the committee.283 As such, this 
analysis requires the court to determine if the committee in question has 
overlapping responsibilities with another official or ad hoc committee. If 
 
 280 FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b). 
 281 Kammona v. Onteco Corp., 587 F. App’x 575, 582 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Betty K Agencies, Ltd. 
v. M/V Monada, 432 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2005)) (emphasis added). 
 282 Kammona, 587 F. App’x at 583. 
 283 It is not difficult, however, to imagine a situation in which a committee is contingently disbanded 
insofar as another committee can be created to represent the creditors at the time of the disbandment of the 
misbehaving committee. Hypothetically, such an order disbanding a committee would, within the same order, 
create another committee (pulling its members from a broader pool of creditors to avoid the replacement 
problem) to immediately step into the shoes of the disbanded committee. The creation of such a new committee 
is no longer controversial and is expressly provided for under 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (a)(2). 
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substantially all of the committee’s responsibilities are duplicative, then the 
committee may be considered redundant. 
Relatedly, the Bankruptcy Code specifically requires the bankruptcy court 
to consider the adequate representation of creditors when modifying a 
committee.284 Judicial modification of a committee is generally viewed as an 
“extraordinary remedy” that courts should grant with reluctance.285 This 
requirement has been translated into a burden placed on the moving party to 
show that the adequate representation of creditors will not be harmed by the 
court’s actions with respect to the committee.286 
The Bankruptcy Code does not provide a framework for determining what 
“adequate representation” of creditors means.287 Nonetheless, courts have 
created an independent seven-step test to aid in determining adequate 
representation when considering whether to order the creation of an additional 
committee: 
 
(1) the ability of the existing committee to function; 
(2) the nature of the case; 
(3) the standing and desires of the various constituencies; 
(4) the ability of creditors to participate in a case without an additional 
committee; 
(5) the delay and additional cost that would result if the court grants 
the motion; 
(6) the tasks which a separate committee is to perform; and 
(7) other factors relevant to the adequate representation issue.288 
This seven-step adequate representation sub-test is easy to incorporate into the 
broader calculus of whether a committee ought to be judicially disbanded. 
Because courts are already familiar with looking to the creditors’ adequate 
representation prior to modifying—or ordering the creation of new—
committees, it would not be difficult for the bankruptcy judge to engage in a 
similar seven-step analysis before deciding to disband a committee. 
Consequently, because the Bankruptcy Code requires the adequate 
 
 284 Id. § 1102(a)(2), (4). 
 285 In re Residential Capital, LLC, 480 B.R. 550, 557 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 286 Id. at 558. 
 287 Id. 
 288 Id. (citing In re Dana Corp., 344 B.R. 35, 38 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006)). 
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representation of creditors, and because bankruptcy judges are already familiar 
with looking to the adequacy of creditors’ representation, judges must safeguard 
adequate representation of creditors before a decision can be made to disband a 
committee. 
A judge may fairly disband a committee if he or she conducts all three 
inquiries, but not if only one of these factors is analyzed by the court. Requiring 
the court to look at all three factors will ensure adequate representation because 
it will create an inherent bias towards preserving the committee. Thus, a 
redundant committee may not be disbanded if the inequity may be resolved by 
a lighter touch. Nor may a committee whose misfeasance or malfeasance cannot 
be resolved by a lighter touch be disbanded if the services it renders are not 
duplicative. This baked-in presumption of committee preservation will ensure 
no violence is done to § 1102, and at the same time will give bankruptcy judges 
an avenue to exercise their § 105(a) equitable powers. Additionally, on appeal, 
non-specialty district judges will be able to more easily and uniformly review 
committee disbandment orders, thus avoiding the messy inquiry into the 
discretion of the bankruptcy judge. Consequently, a three-factor test should be 
adopted to determine if a committee ought to be disbanded. 
CONCLUSION 
Bankruptcy judges must have the authority to disband creditor committees. 
While the case law concerning a judge’s authority to strike a committee is split 
and sparsely populated, a broader understanding of § 105 and analogous areas 
of court authority make clear that a bankruptcy judge has the equitable authority 
to disband a committee for that committee’s misfeasance or malfeasance. We 
know this because of the history of committee formation, because of the prior 
circuit split, and because of the case law on the modern split. 
Although the question of disbandment seems simple on its face, no existing 
court opinion has addressed the issue with complete accuracy. This is because 
courts have inappropriately combined two distinct legal questions. These legal 
questions are whether a bankruptcy judge can second guess the discretion of the 
U.S. Trustee and whether a bankruptcy judge can disband a committee to remedy 
the committee’s misfeasance or malfeasance. From this Comment’s analysis, it 
is clear that § 105 empowers the court to do only the latter and not the former. 
A clear understanding of what question is being asked allows us to analogize 
the more precise issue to similar areas of the law. Doing so reveals that 
bankruptcy judges already have the authority to alter the rights of parties to a 
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bankruptcy if failing to do so would result in some sort of inequity. The 
wellspring for this and many similar equitable court powers is § 105 of the 
Bankruptcy Code. Reading § 105 to delegate the authority to disband a 
misbehaving committee to a bankruptcy judge makes the most sense of Supreme 
Court precedent and avoids throwing into question other similar, but more 
broadly accepted, exercises of court power. 
Finally, a clear answer to a clarified question is not particularly useful to the 
courts unless there is some framework surrounding the use of that authority. As 
such, this Comment proposes a three-factor test to permit bankruptcy judges and 
reviewing courts to determine if a bankruptcy judge has overstepped his or her 
§ 105 equitable authority. In view of this, this Comment has answered the 
procedural question and determined that the court must disband via issuing a 
directive to do so to the U.S. Trustee. 
Ultimately, a bankruptcy court is a court of equity. As such, when a court 
disbands a misbehaving committee, it is the committee that has gone rogue and 
not the judge. 
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